Comments and remarks on the writings of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments
Imagine, if you will, arriving to your best friend's wedding bearing a gift. Except, the gift is what might be, if I may say so, considered by the typical standard, underwhelming, as it was something that you grabbed at the last second, en route to the wedding, with ill an inspired moment of foresight to put forth serious effort into selecting an appropriate gift. And, though the bride and groom may feign appreciation for the gift, as they can hardly scold such an action, they would likely harbor a level of disapprobation, or even resentment, for your action. But, it's the thought that counts, right? Surely, you can claim credit for the fact that you thought about them, and the gift, despite the poor execution of the idea, and that thought weighs enough, perhaps, to balance out.
Obviously, though the example might be unlikely, the thought hardly makes any discernible impact on the perception, and ultimately the judgment of the action. The distinction of when the thought does, or does not, count, lies in something that has been alluded to in prior parts: the ability to enter into a sympathy with the other party. When any particular action is brought home to the breast, as Adam Smith writes, the action can only be judged as necessarily good or evil, acceptable or unacceptable, appropriate or inappropriate, if the judge himself can sympathize with the thought behind the action. If he can enter into a sympathy, then he would necessarily approve - or at least, excuse - the action. If he cannot, however, the action in question cannot be approved of, and the rationale or motives behind it are also deemed inexcusable. Referring back to the example of the wedding, it is nigh inconceivable to think that anyone could willingly enter into an approving sympathy with the ill-prepared gift-giver, as, is often the case, a wedding is not an event of an impromptu nature, and the gift-giver should, the judge might think, have had ample time to prepare. So, too, might the judge be unwilling to believe himself capable of such neglect, ill-preparedness, or even sloth, that they would not enter into a sympathy, lest he might judge himself guilty by approving or excusing the gift-giver's actions.
To take a moral from this, then, would be to be distinctly aware of when the thought truly does, or does not, count, in lieu of - or at least playing part in excusing - what might be called the proper action for the occasion. Whensoever the judge of the action, be it an individual or the masses, can take the rationale, the reasoning, the thought behind the action, home to their own breast, and sympathize with the motive, as they approve of it, the thought is what counts. But, should that judgment within the breast deem the action and motive wanting of sympathy, as the judge deems that they cannot approve of such behavior - as they would be unlikely to see themselves receiving such approval in their sympathetic placing of themselves in the scenario - no motive can justify the action, and the thought, being necessarily disapproved of, does not, in fact, count.