Comments and remarks on the writings of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments
Your favorite chair, cane, plate, coffee cup, what did they do to earn your favoritism? It is funny to think that an inanimate object can hold such esteem, when it has, in fact, done nothing to bring benefit, or harm. The loss of this item might bring some manner of grief, akin to the loss of a loved one. When it is examined further, though, there is a pattern that seems to exist. Adam Smith posits that, in order to be the object of gratitude, or resentment, that object must possess three traits. Something must have the body by which it can perform an action, it must have motive behind the action, and it's actions must have consequences. The last is self-evident, if I may say so, on virtue of the fact that if any action has no consequences, and is thus inconsequential, it is not worth taking into account. The esteemed coffee cup, as an example, indeed does have a body, perhaps of ceramic, to execute its action of transporting liquid. The coffee cup, however, does not have motive behind its actions, and thus, at least according to Adam Smith, can not be the object of our gratitude or resentment. To illustrate the point, upon striking your shin or toe into a piece of furniture, a flash of anger is often common, but, after the moment of pain has passed, we do not hold a grudge against the furniture, for it had no nefarious intentions for our pain, it simply exists. The coffee mug does not hold positive intentions for our pleasure, as it retains the beverage's heat, so why, then, does the cup somehow become a favorite?
Anthropomorphization is a term, long in nature and a frustration to pronounce, that denotes the tendency of humans to give humanistic traits and characteristics to inanimate objects. In the example of the coffee, it is to assign the coffee cup the humanistic trait of compassion for a friend, as the coffee cup would naturally care about its owner, like a pet its owner. This assignment of traits fulfills the second condition of Adam Smith, and thus, allows for an object, rather than just other creatures, fellow or otherwise, to receive the same gratitude, or resentment, that it might be due. The question, or reflection, for today, then, if I may pose it forth, is this: there is no merit - or necessarily demerit - in assigning these traits to inanimate objects, but it does draw an interesting trend. Why is it that positive and gratuitous traits are so readily assigned, assuming the best intentions, to inanimate objects, and not fellow creatures? I would challenge you to examine if you are affording the same benefit of the doubt, and airing on the side of assumption of the good-intention of man, when determining whether an action done had nefarious or benevolent intentions. Peeling back even one layer of a perhaps jaded outlook on fellow-creatures, and applying the same level of impartial analysis of the motivations that we even afford our coffee cups may leave you to find that the world is far more positive than you might otherwise believe.